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ARTICLES
I SHARE, THEREFORE IT'S MINE
Donald J. Kochan *
ABSTRACT
Uniquely interconnecting lessons from law, psychology, and
economics, this article aims to provide a more enriched under-
standing of what it means to "share" property in the sharing
economy. It explains that there is an "ownership prerequisite" to
the sharing of property, drawing in part from the findings of re-
search in the psychology of child development to show when and
why children start to share. They do so only after developing
what psychologists call "ownership understanding." What the
psychological research reveals, then, is that the property system
is well suited to create recognizable and enforceable ownership
norms that include the rights to acquire and retain ownership of
property (parting with it only on terms defined by the owner),
thereby also providing necessary economic incentives to share.
Along the way, this article bridges the psychology research with
Hohfeld's description of the nature of rights, explaining the corre-
sponding rights characterizations appropriate to describe each
step in a child's development of ownership understanding.
When we have a well-developed ownership regime-with a
high reliability of enforcing ownership norms-we create the con-
fidence in ownership that "ownership understanding" reveals is
necessary for individuals to feel secure in sharing. So, too, does
the development of the right to exclude and the corresponding
* Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, Professor of Law, Chapman
University's Dale E. Fowler School of Law. J.D., 1998, Cornell Law School. I would like to
share my thanks for helpful comments from Danny Bogart and Richard Redding, and for
the invaluable assistance of Jennifer Spinella in reviewing drafts of this project.
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right to include in property law track the underlying psychology
to create the prerequisites in law to effect what might be called a
'legal ownership understanding" that feeds the sharing economy,
with sharing being simply an exercise of the right to include. The
article concludes with an ownership-sensitive definition of shar-
ing that should prove useful to courts, regulators, and scholars
alike, while remaining largely agnostic on the scope of desirable
regulation of the sharing economy.
INTRODUCTION
This article employs a unique mix of law, economics, and psy-
chology to better understand the sharing economy and the owner-
ship principles that form its foundation. In essence, it explores
the "ownership prerequisite" to sharing of property in the sharing
economy. Only if an individual owns something can she share it.
So if she shares it, she owns it. Therefore, whatever she shares is
"hers"--even though, for a limited time or for a limited purpose,
someone other than her, a non-owner, is also using or accessing
the property she owns.
Put another way, I have no authority to offer someone the op-
portunity to "share" a property that I do not own.1 I cannot tell
you that you can stay in a room overnight at my colleague's
house, nor can I promise you that, when occupying that room, you
will be immune from a lawsuit or arrest for trespass. Why? Quite
simply because I do not own my colleague's house. I have no legit-
imate power to grant you access, possession, or permission to use
property owned by someone else. I do, though, have the power,
authority, and right as an owner of my property to share the
property that I own with you. As owner, I can become a "sharer"
of my property and, with my permission (contractual or other-
wise), you can become a "sharee" of my property. Ownership is
the key to authorization of that relationship. So, if I indeed share
1. This limitation flows from the basic maxim nemo dat quod non habet. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1933 (10th ed. 2014) ("No one gives what he does not have; no one trans-
fers (a right) that he does not possess.... [N]o one gives a better title to property than he
himself possesses."); see also Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 550 (1872) ("No
one in general can sell personal property and convey a valid title to it unless he is the
owner or lawfully represents the owner. Nemo dat quod non habet."). A related maxim is
also instructive: nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse haberet, which
means: "No one can transfer to another a greater right than he himself might have."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1934 (10th ed. 2014).
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a property with you, then that property must be mine. If it is not,
I cannot "share" it-at least in the sense of the word as here being
used and the sense that, I posit, most people are using the word
"share" and its derivatives when discussing the modern, so-called
"sharing economy." This relatively simple, but exceedingly im-
portant conclusion is what this article will analyze, expand upon,
and defend.
One thing that seems clear is that, as law professor Stephen
Miller has explained, "[s]haring is no longer an idiosyncratic pur-
suit; it is now a mainstream manner of consumption."2 Further-
more, we should expect sharing activities to diversify usage and
for the intensity of their use to accelerate. Commentators and
scholars have described the sharing economy as becoming a
"powerful force of market participation,"3 as generating "intense"
business interest,4 as often being highly profitable,5 as "controver-
sial,"6 and as a "new economic phenomenon" that is taking the
world "by storm."7 It is effecting what Miller has called a "seismic
shift" in the nature of business with the idea of the "sharing econ-
omy" still remaining a "rapidly evolving, elusive concept."8 The
sharing idea is effecting a transformative disruption in our un-
derstanding of property and its social uses. Consumers are de-
manding sharing products-whether it be to "share" because it is
cheaper than buying or cheaper than using incumbent products,9
2. Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 147, 201 (2016).
3. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative
Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2015).
4. John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Owning, Using and Renting: Some Sim-
ple Economics of the "Sharing Economy" 2 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Faculty Res. Working Pa-
per Series, Paper No. 16-007, 2016), https://research.hks.harvard.edulpublications/getFile.
aspx?Id=1307.
5. E.g., Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John W. Byers, The Rise of the Sharing
Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of
Mgmt., Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 (reporting
Airbnb as having an estimated valuation at over $30 billion) (citing Maureen Farrell &
Greg Bensinger, Airbnb's Funding Round Led by Google Capital, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-850-million-at-30-billion-valuation-1474
569670).
6. Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2016).
7. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L.
REV. 61, 63 (2015).
8. Miller, supra note 2, at 149, 150.
9. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV. 989, 1006 (2016) ("[Hlome sharing services allow hosts to monetize unutilized space
and provide renters [a cheaper] alternative to standard hotel accommodations.').
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or whether it is to feel good,° enhance social interaction, or serve
other social goals or values like environmental conservation and
reduction in resource use." That demand is generating supply,
competition, and entrepreneurial enterprises, which are develop-
ing new sharing products and platforms,2 both as disruptive chal-
lengers to incumbent sources but also as generators of completely
new industries.3 Owner-sharers are able to identify new ways to
generate revenue from their assets,14 and user-sharees are able to
satisfy their preferences to have access to property they want to
use but not buy or to procure a service that they want done, but
do not want to perform themselves. These user-sharees get these
benefits-without-ownership seemingly at a lower price or with
other advantages not traditionally available from incumbent
'5
sources.
10. See Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sj6klint & Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why
People Participate in Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. ASS'N INFO. SC. & TECH. 2047,
2055 (2016) ("[O]ur results also suggest that .... [s]ome people might take part in [collab-
orative consumption] simply because it is fun and provides a meaningful way to interact
with other members of the community.... [P]articular motivations of individual partici-
pants vary from mainly altruistic to strongly gain-seeking.").
11. See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 7, at 77 ("Reasons for this preference include ob-
taining access at a lower cost and the flexibility of using items in different locations, which
brings storage advantages.... There are also social and psychological gains, including
making a personal statement that denies the traditional market ownership model and
supports sustainability."); Miller, supra note 2, at 201 (describing motives to share as in-
cluding financial ones, like convenience and price, but also broader concerns like sustaina-
bility and a community connection or feel); The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE
ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-
everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy (describing the environmental and social benefits of
sharing resources).
12. See Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 32 ('The sharing economy has dramati-
cally impacted several important markets in just a few years ... Given the energy and
vision of entrepreneurs, new developments in both technology and the effective communi-
cation of information, [peer-to-peer] rental markets have the potential to transform addi-
tional markets."); Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 7, at 76 ('This new
trend relies on owners that are willing to share and users that prefer to use rather than
own."); Zale, supra note 6, at 525 (discussing the sharing economy as involving "micro-
entrepreneurship").
13. Miller, supra note 2, at 160-61, 164 (describing how the sharing economy is not
just challenging incumbents but also creating new markets and developing new custom-
ers).
14. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 7, at 76-78 ("From the owner's perspective, there are
certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately owned and con-
sumed. Because the excess capacity is not used, certain types of goods are systematically
underexploited.") (emphasis added)).
15. Id. at 77 ("From the user's perspective, potential users of goods and services prefer
to pay or barter for use of a product rather than purchase the product.") (emphasis add-
ed)); Miller, supra note 2, at 160 (describing how the "sharing economy challenges estab-
lished markets" and their incumbent participants).
[Vol. 51:909
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As one might expect, then, literature on the sharing economy
(including as a property law phenomenon) has grown substantial-
ly in reaction to this dynamic and disruptive sensation." Those
writing in the area often recognize an enduring struggle to identi-
fy an adequate definition for the sharing economy. Law professor
Kellen Zale, for example, laments that "It]he debate over the
sharing economy thus remains frustrating and controversial in
large part because we lack a doctrinally cohesive and normatively
satisfying way of talking about the underlying activities occurring
within the sharing economy."1 This article seeks to differentiate
itself and fill a void by identifying a fundamental aspect of the
sharing economy's character-it focuses on the "ownership" pre-
requisite to sharing. I cannot share unless something is mine
first. And, when I share, it is still mine; it is just tangled up in
some consensually created new strands of legal relationships.
While many sophisticated analyses are emerging in the litera-
ture to diagram the complexities and diverse concepts implicated
in the so-called "sharing economy,"18 this article's purpose is more
basic, with the targeted task of emphasizing an otherwise under-
stressed component of the typical sharing of goods and real prop-
erty in the sharing economy: ownership pre-exists the sharing
and that same ownership is sustained while the sharing occurs.
In 2013, The Economist quipped that the sharing economy could
be described as "[w]hat's mine is yours, for a fee."'9 Taken literally
and in isolation, that phrase more adequately describes a transfer
of ownership rather than sharing. When I share property, what is
mine does not become yours; it actually remains mine. So, more
precisely, the sharing economy can be tagged as what's mine is
16. See, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & Roo ROGERS, WHAT'S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION xvi (2010); Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regula-
tion, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
69, 70 (2015); John I. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE
L. POL'Y REV. 215, 221-22 (2016); Dyal-Chand, supra note 3, at 247; Rashmi Dyal-Chand,
Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647, 654 (2013); John Infranca, Intermediary In-
stitutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2016); Christopher
Koopman, Matthew Mitchell, & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy and Consumer Pro-
tection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531
(2015); Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 7, at 68; Miller, supra note 2, at 149; Zale, supra note 6,
at 511.
17. Zale, supra note 6, at 509-10.
18. Infranca, supra note 16, at 31 (discussing the diverse lenses of scholarly expertise
for which the study of the sharing economy has been and could be applied, including tax,
employment, labor, and local government).
19. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 11.
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still mine, but you may use it, access it, and maybe pretend that
it is yours for a limited time and under limited conditions for a
fee. But while you are doing those things, it is still mine and,
when you are done doing those things, it will still be mine. This
fundamental starting point regarding ownership critically in-
forms any evaluation of the structure of the sharing economy and
should inform any choice to regulate the shared asset or the act of
sharing.
The literature to date on the sharing economy has not focused
on sharing as a separate and distinct "stick" in the ownership
bundle. While that sharing stick may be a derivative of the right
to own, to alienate and to include, the sharing stick has its own
characteristics as well, entitling specialized consideration while
fully understanding that the owner may only share the sharing
stick if she owns that stick.
The literature also has not yet directly engaged in an examina-
tion of the fundamental reality that our characterization and
treatment of two concepts-sharing and ownership-have direct
and immediate consequences for the strength of the other. For
example, the only way to reach wise policy on sharing is to ensure
that all decisions regarding the regulation or promotion of shar-
ing includes at least a consideration of the impacts on, or necessi-
ty to bolster or weaken, our protections afforded to the concept
and characteristics of ownership itself.
This article is largely agnostic on the scope of desirable regula-
tion of the sharing economy and does not set forth any specific
recommendations for the form that any such regulation might
take. There is no doubt that one of the exigencies in identifying
appropriate working definitions and understandings of sharing is
that, as of now, activities in the sharing economy "operate in a
murky area of the law that's receiving greater scrutiny and creat-
ing controversy."0 But whether existing zoning, landlord-tenant,
housing, business licensing, hospitality, public accommodation, or
transportation laws, for example, can be utilized or whether new
regulatory structures are needed to fit these new and emerging
20. Kevin Davis, Guest Wrong: Website Raises Legal Questions About Homeowners
and Tenants Hosting Travelers, 100 A.B.A.J. 19, 19 (2014).
[Vol. 51:909
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business models, services, and practices is beyond the scope of
this article.2
Instead, the point here is that whatever we do as a society, our
choice of regulatory approach (including choices not to regulate)
for the sharing economy must be informed by the fact that, first
and foremost-to paraphrase Justice John Marshall's famous
words in McCulloch v. Maryland-we must never forget that the-
se are individual property ownership rights we are affecting."
The United States Supreme Court famously opined in United
States v. Willow River Power Co. that "not all economic interests
are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights'
which have the law back of them, and only when they are so rec-
ognized may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with
them or to compensate for their invasion."23 Consequently, it be-
comes important that the laws surrounding the sharing economy
recognize and give due consideration to the status of sharing
rights as property rights-not simply economic interests.
In Part I, this article examines the psychology literature on a
concept called "ownership understanding." It describes the exist-
ence of strong, enforceable private property mechanisms and that
our confidence in them is directly proportional to our willingness
to share. By linking law with psychology, this part injects a
unique and heretofore missing psychology-based perspective into
the legal literature to help owners and regulators better under-
stand the sharing motivation and its interconnection with our
system for recognizing private property rights. It draws insights
from child psychology, including how we, as humans, come to un-
derstand ownership and only fully agree to "share" in its fullest
sense once we develop ownership understanding. At the same
time, it lends legal insight to concepts of ownership and sharing
studied from a psychological basis. Included in this effort is an
21. Many others have begun to focus their analyses on the necessity, development,
and appropriate form of a regulatory structure or the need to refrain from regulation. See
generally, e.g., Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the "Sharing" Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397,
1403 (2016) (building on insights from pluralistic theory to develop a contextual regulatory
model for the sharing economy); Miller, supra note 2, at 150 (evaluating existing and pro-
posing new approaches to regulating the sharing economy); Zale, supra note 6, at 513 (de-
veloping a conceptual and definitional framework to inform future policy regulation of the
sharing economy).
22. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Justice Marshall advised as he evaluated the case that
"we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
23. 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
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overlay of the Hohfeldian description of the nature of rights with
the psychology literature's description of the stages of children's
development of correlated psychological understandings of own-
ership and sharing related concepts.
Once we have some sense of how sharing motivations develop
in humans, Part II provides some basic background on the struc-
ture of the sharing economy itself, thereafter focusing this article
primarily on the sharing of real property and goods.
Part III then examines property law and some of its fundamen-
tal characteristics, including the right to exclude and correspond-
ingly include. These concepts make sharing more understandable.
Sharing, as used in the sharing economy's real property and
goods sectors, embodies the relaxation of the right to exclude
(without sacrificing ownership sticks) through exercise of the
right to include. Thereafter, Part IV provides an ownership-based
definition of sharing that could be beneficial when employed in
ongoing discussions about the future of the sharing economy, giv-
ing proper context and appreciation to the ownership principles
at stake in any regulatory decision. Part V briefly outlines the
regulatory status quo and expected regulatory future for the shar-
ing economy. So long as we correctly conceive of sharing as a stick
in one's bundle of property rights, regulatory responses to sharing
necessarily implicate our overall protections for individual owner-
ship.
Through each of these parts, this article explains that strong
ownership understanding and a confidence in the enforceability of
ownership rights is a necessary precondition for sharing. This
leads to one of the principal conclusions in this article: without
strong protection for ownership principles, we cannot expect a ro-
bust or effective sharing economy. And, at the very least, we must
understand the ownership role in sharing if we are to reach sound
legal decisions and develop wise public policy that accounts for all
concerns.
I. THE LINK BETWEEN "OWNERSHIP UNDERSTANDING" AND
SHARING: INSIGHTS FROM CHILD DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
A recent generation of children grew up learning from a purple
dinosaur that "caring means sharing" (or "sharing is caring").24
24. See, e.g., Barney & Friends, Season 1, Ep. 9, Caring Means Sharing, INTERNET
MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1204195/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
[Vol. 51:909
I SHARE, THEREFORE ITS MINE
Long before and since, other children have heard similar refrains
from different sources. But what if a child does not care for the
proposed sharee? Must the child share? Of course not. Perhaps
understated in this loveable lesson is the reality that one can vol-
untarily choose whether to share or not share. This matter of
choice is especially important because research reveals that chil-
dren are most resistant to share when they feel compelled to
share (rather than doing so on their own terms)," which may un-
derscore a natural inclination towards ownership principles, such
as the right to retain property."
Thus, part of the parenting lesson involved in encouraging
children to share lies in understanding the development of con-
sensual social relations.27 The typical child's reaction-exclaiming
"that's mine" when resisting sharing or when just staking a claim
to a toy that is about to be confiscated by a playmate-
demonstrates a natural human inclination towards possession
and an unwillingness to relinquish control over possessed re-
sources." Studying a child's reactions as they develop with age
and move from a possession-based to ownership-based approach
reveals much about our natural understanding of the meaning,
qualities, and terms of "sharing," as it relates to property.
Substantial psychological research-particularly on a concept
known as "ownership understanding"-illuminates the fact that a
child's approach to sharing can be fully developed only after first
developing an understanding of what ownership really means, in-
cluding an appreciation for the full range of rights (and demands
for their enforcement) associated with private property.29 As
25. See Giving Preschoolers Choice Increases Sharing Behavior, ASS'N PSYCHOL. SCI.
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/releases/giving-preschoolers-ch
oice-increases-sharing-behavior.htmll ("Getting kids to share their toys is a never-ending
battle, and compelling them to do so never seems to help.").
26. See generally Donald J. Kochan, Keepings, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 355, 356 (2015)
(discussing the legal doctrines and principles relating to owners retention of their property
and why such doctrines are necessary in an effective property system).
27. See Giving Preschoolers Choice, Increases Sharing Behavior, supra note 25.
28. Kochan, supra note 26, at 356; see Cliff Goddard & Anna Wierzbicka, 'It's Mine!'
Re-thinking the Conceptual Semantics of 'Possession" Through NSM, 56 LANGUAGE SC.
93, 93, 102 (2016) (recognizing that "mine" is a semantic primitive available in all lan-
guages and that "in all languages, apparently, the same grammatical markers a are used
to express 'ownership"'); see also Jill Fraley, The Meaning of Dispossession 2 (Wash. & Lee
Pub. Legal Stud. Res., Paper No. 2017-1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers2.cfm?ab
stractid=2905798 ("Cross-culturally, most children's fights involve property.").
29. Celia A. Brownell et al., Mine or Yours? Development of Sharing in Toddlers in
Relation to Ownership Understanding, 84 CHILD DEV. 908 (2013).
20171
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Brownell et al., psychologists from the University of Pittsburgh,
explain, "[o]ne aspect of early social cognition that may be fun-
damental to the development of sharing is ownership understand-
ing. Ownership is an invisible attribute of an object that is social-
ly and normatively defined and that confers unique possession
rights."3 It then follows that "[b]ecause sharing entails transfer-
ring ownership, whether temporarily (as in sharing one's toys
with a friend) or permanently (as in sharing food with a parent),
until children understand ownership they cannot truly be charac-
terized as sharing."3 This research reveals that, starting from
early childhood, an appreciation for ownership and the concept of
private property are a necessary step in a human's development
of social integration skills, including the willingness to share.
This willingness develops in full form only once one also develops
the interdependent and prerequisite understanding of the right to
not share or the right to share but with conditions.32
Hence, for an activity to be considered "sharing," Brownell et
al. explain, the sharer first must appreciate that she owns the
thing she is offering to "share" with another.33 Otherwise, it is just
some activity motivated, tolerated, or to which the child acquiesc-
es for some other reason (such as, perhaps, because the child does
not know that she has the power to say no or the child shows em-
pathy-like when the child might allow another thirsty child to
drink from one's cup of water).34
This ownership understanding progressively emerges within
the first five years of a child's life. Early on, very young children
see sharing as particularly risky because they fear becoming dis-
possessed and worry about the consequences associated with the
loss of physical control over the thing." It is unclear whether very
early-stage protests against having a toy taken away are a result
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Peter R. Blake & Paul L. Harris, Children's Understanding of Ownership
Transfers, 24 COGNITIVE DEV. 133, 133-34 (2009) ("Children must learn social rules re-
garding private property in order to integrate into their peer groups and society at large.
Understanding ownership is therefore an important part of children's development.").
33. Brownell et al., supra note 29, at 908.
34. See id. at 908-09.
35. See generally id. at 907-08 (noting the generally low rates of sharing among young
children especially, and studying the underlying factors associated with that behavior).
[Vol. 51:909
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of ownership principles," yet the research seems clear that con-
cepts of ownership begin to emerge in later years in steps. The
psychology research reveals that "ownership concepts in toddlers
are still fragile and may be specific to particular objects and con-
texts," but the ownership concept "begins to appear in primitive
form" by age two. 7 During the second year, for example, Brownell
et al. and previous studies find that struggles over objects "be-
come increasingly common."3 Nonetheless, at this step, the child
seems to be developing a sense of "mine" but not yet a sense of
"yours" (or "theirs")-with an appreciation and respect for both
"mine" and "yours" concepts still necessary before true ownership
is understood.39
It is useful to think about these stages of development as stag-
es of understanding the nature of rights. Consider how the psy-
chology research discussed here can be related to the seminal
work on the nature of rights by the noted jurist and law professor
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. In his work, Hohfeld endeavored to
identify and distinguish the core elements of rights, privileges,
immunities, and liabilities." Hohfeld sets out the definitions and
distinctions as follows:
[A] power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that a
right does to a privilege. A right is one's affirmative claim against
another, and a privilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of
another. Similarly, a power is one's affirmative "control" over a given
legal relation as against another; whereas an immunity is one's free-
dom from the legal power or "control" of another as regards some le-
gal relation.41
Hohfeld's definition of immunities is further benefited by the fol-
lowing example:
36. Id. at 909 (exploring alternate justifications that may make a child protest the loss
of a toy in the first year of development, such as loss of pleasure).
37. Id. at 909, 918 ("Between 18 and 24 months of age, other-oriented resource shar-
ing becomes more frequent, spontaneous, and autonomous, with less need for support and
encouragement from the recipient. This transformation is accompanied by, and perhaps
partly driven by, growth in social understanding, including which things belong to self and
others and language denoting ownership such as 'mine' and 'yours."').
38. Id. at 909.
39. Id. ("[A] young child without ownership understanding may not know that some-
one else wants something of 'theirs,' or may fail to understand that they can opt to give
'their' toy to the other.").
40. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
41. Id. at 55.
20171
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X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate to Y or to
any other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has also various im-
munities as against Y, and all other ordinary parties. For Y is under
a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as shifting the legal interest ei-
ther to himself or to a third party is concerned; and what is true of Y
applies similarly to every one else who has not by virtue of special
operative facts acquired a power to alienate X's property.42
By identifying the owner's control over alienability and all oth-
ers' lack of power (or disability) to take away (or shift) that inter-
est to anyone else, Hohfeld claims the owner is thereby usually
the holder of "immunities" against all others.4' These immunities
are freedoms from the actions, wants, demands, or control of oth-
ers-including the freedom from others' attempts to take property
away from an owner. An owner can assert her immunity against
those who have no legitimate claim to the property because those
persons are at a disability vis-A-vis the property and its owner.
Applying Hohfeld's concepts to the successive developmental
stages of a child's understanding of rights associated with proper-
ty can enrich psychological insight into the law of sharing. As
stated above, we know from the research in child developmental
psychology that a child's understanding of "mine"-establishing
claim to ownership of a thing and what Hohfeld might call a
"power"4 4 -happens before Child A can appreciate that the object
held by someone else, Person B, is "theirs" (i.e., Person B's).45 So,
at this stage, Child A does not yet appreciate what Hohfeld would
call the "disability" under which Child A is operating-that is,
Child A cannot make any legitimate claim to the object and there-
fore cannot compel Person B turn over the object. However, be-
cause Child A does not yet have full ownership understanding
and cannot recognize her own disability, Child A does not yet re-
spect Person B's immunity from Child A's demands.
Similarly, if Child A is currently holding an object owned by




45. Brownell et al., supra note 29, at 909 (noting that "ownership language also
emerges gradually over early childhood with my and mine appearing before his/hers or
yours") (citing Elizabeth Bates, Language About Me and You: Pronominal Reference and
the Emerging Concept of Self, in THE SELF IN TRANSITION: INFANCY TO CHILDHOOD 165,
175 (Dante Cicchetti & Majorie Beeghly eds., 1990); Alison Imbens-Bailey & Barbara Al-
exander Pan, The Pragmatics of Self- and Other-Reference In Young Children, 7 Soc. DEv.
219, 231 (1998)).
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But if Child A does not yet understand the meaning of "theirs,"
then she might refuse to do so. In this scenario, Person B is also
holding what Hohfeld would describe as an "immunity"-right to
keep the property or demand its return from Child A 4"-which in-
cludes the ability to refuse to adhere to demands made and to re-
pel confiscatory actions by those who would like to take the object
away from Person B without consent.
Brownell et al. describe situations in which children at around
eighteen months try to retain possession of a toy once they have
gained it, even if it does not belong to that child and was original-
ly possessed by another.47 And, by around age two, a child at this
point of development is asserting "mine" in relation to things
presently possessed, seemingly both legitimating their claim to
the object on current possession alone and failing to understand
the claim of the other child held based on prior possession (or le-
gal priority)." Brownell et al. explain: "Although [two]-year-olds
recognize their own property rights, they do not seem to under-
stand ownership norms more generally: They protest if their own
belongings are taken, but they do not recognize the injustice of
someone else's belongings being taken."9 At this age, one's ability
to grasp "yours" and "theirs" is still underdeveloped. Developing
an understanding of "mine" precedes developing an understand-
ing of "yours" or "theirs,"" so children before age five remain
without an appreciation of their duty to return the property of
others (or even to refrain from taking it in the first place)."
46. Kochan, supra note 26, at 359.
47. Brownell et al., supra note 29, at 909 (stating that at 18 months, "when the origi-
nal possessor tried to regain the toy, the toy takers protested just as much as when some-
one without any previous possession history tried to take it") (citing Roger Bakeman &
John R. Brownlee, Social Rules Governing Object Conflicts in Toddlers and Preschoolers,
in PEER RELATIONSHIPS AND SOCIAL SKILLS IN CHILDHOOD 99, 108 (Kenneth H. Rubin &
Hildy S. Ross eds., 1982); see also Carol 0. Eckerman & Karen Peterman, Peers and Infant
Social/Communicative Development, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF INFANT DEVELOPMENT
326, 343 (Alan Fogel & Gavin Bremner eds., 2001) (discussing the social nature of twenty-
one-month-old toddlers during conflicts over objects); Dale F. Hay & Hildy S. Ross, The
Social Nature of Early Conflict, 53 CHILD DEV. 105, 106 (1982)).
48. See Brownell et al., supra note 29, at 909 (citing Federico Rossano, Hannes
Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello, Young Children's Understanding of Violations of Property
Rights, 121 COGNITION 219, 220, 224 (2011)).
49. Id. (noting that "[s]imilarly, [two]- and [three]-year-old children do not seem to
understand group ownership").
50. Id.
51. See Blake & Harris, supra note 32, at 143 (discussing children's ability to distin-
guish types of transfers).
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In Hohfeldian terms, then, the child at this stage is asserting
an overinclusive power (an ownership claim in all things pos-
sessed) and an overbroad immunity (the right to keep what he
possesses despite he demands of another making a claim to it)
without recognizing the existence of a disability (that he cannot
take the property of another or retain possession of the property
owned by another once a demand has been made for its return).52
Sharing starts to seem less risky when it becomes clearer to the
child that continuous possession is not a necessary requirement
to claim ownership of the thing; she has the capability to demand
its return, and there is a reciprocal duty on the sharee to return
the thing upon demand.3 With ownership understanding, the
child starts to appreciate the distinctions between the nature of
rights associated with the thing and to understand how owner-
ship principles govern sharing and other transfers of possession.
This situational change is consistent with Brownell et al.'s find-
ing that "sharing varied with children's social understanding,"
and with their findings that, "[i]n particular, ownership under-
standing was positively associated with how often and how quick-
ly children shared, even with age and general language compe-
tence controlled; conversely, non-sharing behavior was negatively
associated with social understanding.,
54
Peter Blake and Paul Harris, psychology and education profes-
sors at Harvard University, similarly identify that this "owner-
ship understanding" begins to develop in an appreciable sense
usually around age five,5 at which point a child begins to develop
an appreciation for the rights of retention inherent in the distinc-
tion between legitimate and illegitimate transfers (such as steal-
ing).56 Custom and imposed norms supporting the ownership val-
52. See Hohfeld, supra note 40, at 55.
53. See Brownell et al., supra note 29, at 909 ("It might be expected, therefore, that
young children would be less likely to share their things spontaneously with others prior
to development of such [ownership] understanding.")
54. Id. at 915.
55. Blake & Harris, supra note 32, at 141 ('The results from the two experiments con-
tribute to our understanding of how children's understandings about ownership develop. A
mature understanding of ownership requires an appreciation that permanent transfers of
property are possible as well as the ability to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate
transfers. Not until [five] years of age do children attain this mature view. Five-year olds
recognize that ownership is permanently transferred when a gift is given but not when
property is stolen.'.
56. Id. at 141, 143 ("The two studies provide strong evidence that by [five] years of
age, children possess a mature understanding of ownership in several important respects.
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ue replace possession as the means by which claim is demon-
strated. 7 Brownell et al. explain this progression (around age
five) as a point where children develop wisdom regarding the
complementary nature of the "mine/yours" notions, reporting that
"an important feature of ownership understanding is knowing
that what is 'mine' is 'not yours,' and vice versa."58 Consequently,
as "mine" and "yours" concepts begin to develop, children start to
become more likely to share.9
Extending from these findings, it seems likely that a child who
is told to share also understands the difference between commu-
nal toys and individually owned toys.6 Based on the insights from
ownership understanding, we should expect children to be less
resistant in such communal situations and less possessive or ter-
ritorial when they have no pre-attachment o the thing and no a
priori claim to its control.
Finally, we might posit that children experience joy when ac-
quiring things that they can call "mine" once they know the full
nature of the rights associated with such a claim. For example, a
child might experience such joy because she knows that she is not
required to share but that she could, if she chooses, capitalize on
the rewards of sharing made uniquely available when she (as
owner) and the recipient (as a non-owner without any ex ante en-
titlement to use or access the thing) both understand that she is
doing something above and beyond what she could be legitimately
compelled to do. Thus, the owner is creating an occasion for grati-
tude or compensation from the benefitted recipient. With owner-
ship understanding, rewards from sharing can also come in terms
First, they recognize that ownership can be permanently transferred from one person to
another. Second, they distinguish legitimate transfers, like giving, from illegitimate trans-
fers, like stealing. Finally, they recognize that this distinction applies to both children and
adults. Their mature understanding of giving and stealing provides a firm foundation for
learning about more complex interactions with property."); see also Brownell et al., supra
note 29, at 917 (discussing their findings as consistent with a "previous naturalistic study
which found that toddlers who produced more ownership language were more likely to
share with agemates") (citing D.F. Hay, Yours and Mine: Toddlers' Talk About Possessions
with familiar peers, 24 BRIT. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 39, 52 (2006)).
57. Blake & Harris, supra note 32, at 141-42.
58. Brownell, supra note 29, at 909.
59. Id. (citing Hay, supra note 56, at 50).
60. See id. at 917 ("Toddlers may also be starting to distinguish between ownership
and possession, with [two]-year-olds understanding that they were granted temporary
possession of the playroom toys but not ownership, which could contribute to their greater
willingness to share them.').
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of parental praise,6 strengthening a friendship through a grateful
sharee, or even through bargaining (whether it be bartering and
reciprocity in getting to play with the sharee's toys or some other
type of exchange).62
In light of all of this, it may be reasonable to make the bold
claim that our earliest understanding of the value of property as-
sets actually develops when we realize we have control over
whether or not to share our toys and other early possessions. The
value lies in control, the right to choose not to share (and to ex-
clude) and the endless possibilities from various permutations as-
sociated with exercising the right to include (from which we can
obtain and internalize payments for the use and access to our
owned things). Thus, ownership facilitates sharing, and sharing
is contingent on ownership and our understanding of it.
To summarize some of these psychological findings, it is useful
to describe the starting point for one of the key research studies
discussed above. Brownell et al. set out to study whether there
was a relationship between ownership understanding and the
likelihood of sharing, "hypothesiz[ing] that children with more
advanced ownership understanding, broadly defined, would be
more likely to share their toys with a playmate who had none.63
One could re-characterize this inquiry as designed to test whether
children are more likely to share if they know they will get the
shared object back. Brownell et al.'s findings "confirmed that
children who shared more quickly, with fewer cues, and children
who shared more often before being asked by the partner were
more advanced in self-understanding and better understood own-
ership."' In fact, after evaluating the possible factors that ac-
count for varied approaches to possession and to willingness to
share, "ownership understanding" proved singularly important to
a heightened propensity to share (even after age-related factors
61. Id. at 907 ("[T]hese early social acts may not be prosocial in the sense of behavior
that is intended to benefit another. Infants may show a toy to an adult as an act of emo-
tion or attention sharing, or they may be seeking a positive reaction or other form of ap-
proval from the adult; they may offer a toy as a way to get the adult to play with them or
as part of a regular game or routine, or deposit a toy in the adult's lap to prevent another
child from gaining access to it.").
62. Id. at 917-18 (asserting that as children start developing the basics of ownership
understanding, they "begino to understand ownership as a socially defined attribute of
objects may provide a rational basis for sharing, as well as an early normative standard
for object exchange").
63. Id. at 910.
64. Id. at 914.
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are removed, demonstrating a continuing impact of ownership
understanding, regardless of age).6" In Brownell et al.'s study,
ownership understanding proved far more useful in explaining
individuals' differences in sharing than other concepts of self-
understanding.66
Sharing starts to seem more acceptable to a child when a child
understands their reciprocal claims and obligations regarding
owned things .67 In other words, we are more willing to share once
we know three things: (1) we can get our things back; (2) we can
set the terms and conditions of sharing; and (3) the sharee must
accept the bitter with the sweet in sharing and abide by the own-
er's terms if the sharee wishes to have the benefit of using, pos-
sessing, or accessing the property of another. We are more willing
to share when there are strong property norms, backed by the
confidence generated by strong property rights enforcement
mechanisms.
These conclusions are consistent with Brownell et al.'s child
psychology study, which concluded that "associations between
ownership understanding and sharing were positive" despite that
"one might intuitively expect the reverse-as children better un-
derstand ownership, their property claims should increase and
their willingness to share should decline."6 The counterintuitive
result may be explained by the feelings of security in ownership
generated once one can fully associate with ownership values, can
contemplate the complete package of rights inherent in property
(including powers, immunities, and disabilities), and has some
confidence in the availability of norm enforcement through cus-
toms or laws. Brownell et al. continue, for example, to explain
that the increased sharing associated with increased ownership
understanding may be reflective of the fact that "[t]oddlers may
be starting to understand that ownership can be exchanged be-
tween consenting individuals, and that others have expectations
with respect to owned things, that objects can make others happy,
65. Id. at 917.
66. Id. ("Once age was controlled, however, self-understanding was no longer a signif-
icant predictor, whereas ownership understanding continued to be associated with shar-
ing. In other words, both self-understanding and ownership understanding explained age-
related variation in sharing, but only ownership understanding explained individual dif-
ferences in sharing above and beyond age-related influences.").
67. See id. at 917-18.
68. Id. at 917.
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and other embryonic notions of objects as possessing social val-
ue.
' 69
These findings within the field of psychology demonstrate that
an individual's willingness and propensity to share her property
are directly proportional to the strength of her understanding of
the ownership concept and confidence in her claim to ownership
over the things which she might be willing to share. Brownell et
al., state that "[miature ownership understanding also distin-
guishes between possession and ownership . . . which should
make sharing easier when it entails temporary transfer of physi-
cal possession while retaining ownership and its corresponding
rights."7 In many ways, the sharing economy very much mirrors
this effect, focusing on temporary access to another's property ra-
ther than sacrificing ownership attributes.71
The child development findings regarding ownership under-
standing provide a platform from which property law can model
its own ownership-protective blueprint. As the psychological re-
search reveals, the property system is well-suited to create recog-
nizable and enforceable ownership norms that include the rights
to acquire and thereafter retain ownership of property, parting
with such property only on terms defined by the owner. When we
have such a well-developed ownership regime-with reliability
upon enforceable, neutral ownership norms-we create the confi-
dence in ownership that ownership understanding reveals is nec-
essary for individuals to feel secure in sharing. Thus, when a
property law system protects ownership, it is working to stimu-
late the ownership understanding that humans develop psycho-
logically in early childhood. It is capitalizing on humans' natural
expectations regarding ownership.
Consequently, there are many good reasons for developing a
property law system with strong protections for ownership, not
the least of which is because it provides the necessary conditions
under which sharing (a pro-social activity which is both culturally
and economically beneficial) is most likely to occur and thrive. In
fact, the child development research reveals humans are particu-
larly affected by their confidence in a right to exclude or prevent
69. Id.
70. Id. at 909 (citing Blake & Harris, supra note 32, at 133-34).
71. See Zale, supra note 6, at 568 ("Property sharing involves the provision of tempo-
rary access to property.").
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takings of property (and the related right to demand return of
things).72 Once an individual believes that she has that immunity
(in Hohfeldian terms), she becomes willing to exercise the power
that comes with it-to choose to include others, including by shar-
ing.
So, the development of the right to exclude and the correspond-
ing right to include in property law tracks the underlying psy-
chology to create the prerequisites in law to effect what might be
called a "legal ownership understanding." This legal understand-
ing should generate the same motivational and behavioral reac-
tions in all humans which can be expected through social under-
standing of ownership norms. By keeping the legal-psychology
consistent with the social-psychology, the law is able to replicate
and solidify the benefits that accrue from confident beliefs in an
individual's ability to control the things that she owns. The law
makes her willing to share because she knows that the law will
protect her concomitant right to set the terms of the sharing.
Ownership empowers an individual to make a choice whether
or not to share. If she shares, it is because it is hers-rather than
sharing because of some mistaken belief that she must or some
diminished sense of entitlement to make a claim to the property
as hers and hers alone. Moreover, even if she has possession of an
object, she is less likely to share it without a preceding belief that
it is "hers" (in the sense of being able to say to herself that she
owns the thing, and all that is attached to the ownership concept
attaches to the thing, as well). She shares, therefore it is hers
(and she shares when she knows it is "hers").73
II. SOME VERY BASIC BACKGROUND ON THE SHARING ECONOMY
AND EXISTING LITERATURE
The concepts related to sharing real property, goods, and ser-
vices have taken on many monikers, including among the most
72. Kochan, supra note 26, at 356. See generally Blake & Harris, supra note 32 (stat-
ing that "by 5 years of age, children possess a mature understanding of ownership transfer
whereas younger children are prone to biases); Brownell et al., supra note 29 (finding that
"[olwnership understanding... was positively associated with sharing and negatively as-
sociated with non-sharing behavior, independent of age and language ability").
73. If an object is not hers, of course, she cannot share it legitimately (nemo dat quod
non habet). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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common, but not limited to: the sharing economy,74 the peer-to-
75peer economy, peer-to-peer consumption,6  collaborative con-
sumption, and access-based consumption.
Despite the similarities between these terms and the activities
they attempt to categorize, there is no "universally accepted defi-
nition, ' nor is a one-size-fits-all definition or label possible (or
even desirable) for the variety of emerging sharing activities."
Nonetheless, as Koopman et al., economists from the Mercatus
Center at George Mason University, suggests, "it is helpful to
think of the sharing economy as any marketplace that brings to-
gether distributed networks of individuals to share or exchange
otherwise underutilized assets."'" Furthermore, the exchange
might be for monetary or non-monetary benefits which accrue to
the owner of such under-utilized assets and would otherwise be
unrealized but for the sharing.2 In such a context, "sharing"
means that the assets or services are allowed to be (often non-
exclusively) used or consumed by someone other than the owner
74. See, e.g., Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 1 ("In recent years, technology
startup firms have created a new kind of rental market, in which owners sometimes use
their assets for personal consumption and sometimes rent them out. Such markets are re-
ferred to as peer-to-peer or 'sharing economy' markets.").
75. See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 3, at 243 (explaining "collaborative consumption"
and "peer-to-peer" as alternative labels to describe "the sharing economy").
76. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 991 ("Also known as 'collaborative consump-
tion,' the 'peer-to-peer economy' or 'peer-to-peer consumption,' a broad range of commenta-
tors suggest that the sharing economy is transforming the way people consume and supply
goods and services, such as transportation, accommodations, and task help.").
77. See, e.g., Hamari et al., supra note 10, at 2049 ("We define the term [collaborative
consumption] broadly as the peer-to-peer-based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing
access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based online services."); Mil-
ler, supra note 2, at 150 (describing alternative names including "collaborative consump-
tion" and "access-based consumption").
78. Miller, supra note 2, at 150.
79. Koopman et al., supra note 16, at 531; see also Zale, supra note 6, at 526 ('The
lack of consensus about terminology is driven in large part by the lack of consensus about
how to define the sharing economy.").
80. Zale, supra note 6, at 509-10 ('The activities blur the familiar binary divisions-
personal and commercial, gratuitous and nongratuitous, formal and informal-that the
law employs to characterize human activities.... sharing economy activities combine fea-
tures of familiar property law forms-such as leases and licenses..").
81. Koopman et al., supra note 16, at 531.
82. Rand Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shar
ed-definition ("An economic model based on sharing underutilized assets ... for monetary
or non-monetary benefits.').
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of the property or provider of the services.83 This idea of maximiz-
ing the use of unused or under-utilized assets is a critical, unify-
ing characteristic in defining sharing.' Underutilization is a
common characteristic because many properties directed towards
sharing activity have "excess capacity"" or what some label "idle
capacity""-more capacity than the owner can herself use at once
and can thereby be monetized.s7 I do not use my house when I am
on vacation.88 I do not use my car during the workday. I do not
use my tools most of the time.89 I generally only use the driver's
seat in my vehicle, meaning most of the carrying capacity of my
vehicle goes unused,9" and so on. The goal is to capture the "sur-
plus value" of these unused or under-utilized assets.9
83. See id.
84. See Andrew T. Bond, An App for That: Local Governments and the Rise of the
Sharing Economy, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 77, 78 (2015) ("The sharing economy is
a microeconomic system built around the utilization of unused human and physical re-
sources" as connected "via technology"); Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 997 ("While there is
no universal definition of the term 'sharing economy,' commentators have described it as a
model of production, consumption and distribution of goods and services whereby people
'share' their assets or other resources on an excess capacity basis via peer-to-peer ar-
rangements.").
85. See Aloni, supra note 21, at 1403-04 (discussing the relationship between sharing
economy and utilization of excess capacity); Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 22
('The attributes that make a good 'shareable' get attention from Benkler. He points out
that some goods are 'lumpy' in that you cannot buy less than some threshold amount, but
once you own it, it invariably has excess capacity.") (discussing Yochai Benkler, Sharing
Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Pro-
duction, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 356 (2004)).
86. Zale, supra note 6, at 527-28 ("The economic driver of the sharing economy is
what some have referred to as the commodification of 'idle capacity,' or the monetization of
previously unused or underused assets. The types of assets being monetized fall into two
general categories: goods or services.").
87. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 990-91 ("On the supply side, these models enable
owners of homes, apartments, or vehicles, or those who possess certain skills (such as
house painting, home organization, or dogsitting) to monetize those assets or skills.").
88. Zale, supra note 6, at 530 ("[T]he 'sweet spot' for asset monetization appears to be
'high cost, infrequently used' goods ... [such as] a place to sleep in a city you do not live in,
or a car in a city where it is expensive or inconvenient to own a car.") (quoting Gansky,
infra 93, at 23).
89. See id. ('The types of property being monetized in the sharing economy spans the
gamut from low cost, infrequently used goods, such as blenders and nail guns, to high cost,
frequently used goods, such as laptops.").
90. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 3, at 253-54 ("In the areas of home and car shar-
ing ... individuals also share the excess capacity of assets that they do not fully use or
need for themselves with strangers-for a price. Without the ability to share, these as-
sets-for example, the back seats of cars-would have much less value.").
91. Id. at 255 ('Philosophers of the sharing economy claim that increasing access to
property can best capture the surplus value of property-not collateralizing it or excluding
others from it.").
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The sharing economy is often tied with the label collaborative
consumption because it really is largely a matter of providing ac-
cess in order to temporarily consume property rather than provid-
ing a transfer of ownership rights in the property.92 Property
owned by Owner A is consumed by Stranger B.
As the lists of examples often provided in the literature on the
sharing economy regularly illustrate,93 the types of sharing are
varied,94 diverse,95 and growing. Consequently, one seeking to
analyze the sharing economy should avoid inappropriate general-
92. Hamari et al., supra note 10, at 2047 (defining '"collaborative consump-
tion'/'sharing economy"' as " [tihe peer-to-peer-based activity of obtaining, giving, or shar-
ing the access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based online ser-
vices"); Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 146 (2015) ("In
the standard usage of the phrase [sharing economy], owners rent out personal assets that
they are not using, including cars, housing, and household items. Access substitutes for
ownership: via the internet, owners of underused assets connect to those willing to pay to
use them.").
93. The purposes of this article do not require making a list of examples of sharing
platforms and enterprises. Nonetheless, for those curious about the depth of examples
available, consider for example the useful sampling of the types of companies that facili-
tate sharing of goods or real property (along with services, which are largely beyond the
scope of this article) provided by Fraiberger and Sundararajan:
In recent years, a number of Internet and mobile-device enabled peer-to-peer
marketplaces have emerged to facilitate the short-term rental of durable
goods. Examples include Getaround and Re-layRides (which enable car own-
ers to supply their vehicles as short-term rentals), Airbnb (which allows con-
sumers to rent their living space to others for short periods) and StyleLend
(peer-to-peer rental of apparel and accessories). These are specific examples
of a much broader array of new platforms which facilitate market-based trade
between private individuals for a variety of assets and services, from urban
transportation (Lyft, Sidecar, Uber), dining (Kitchit, EatWith) and inter-city
transit (BlaBlaCar, carpooling.com) to labor (TaskRabbit, Handy), local deliv-
ery (Instacart, Postmates), and short-term loans (Lending Club, Funding Cir-
cle), collectively sometimes referred to as creating a new "sharing economy."
Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer Rental Markets in the Sharing
Economy 3 (N.Y.U. Stern Sch. of Bus. Research Paper, Oct. 6, 2015), https://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2574337 (citing BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 16; LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY
THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING 201 (2012)); Arun Sundararajan, From Zipcar to the
Sharing Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 3, 2013), https:/Ihbr.org/2013/01/from-zip car-to-
the-sharing-eco/.
94. See Lee, supra note 92, at 147 (providing a diverse set of examples that illustrate
"[t]he sharing economy may be conceptualized into three broad categories: (1) product ser-
vice systems; (2) redistribution markets; and (3) collaborative lifestyles . . . . [T]he vast
majority of these markets do not involve sharing in the traditional sense, but the exchange
of goods or money for profit."); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 998 (2016) ("With the
ease provided by... technology, almost anything-bicycles, wifi, clothing, and even kit-
tens and toilets-can be shared.).
95. Miller, supra note 2, at 150-51 (recognizing that the sharing economy is a diverse
concept with differentiated sharing models requiring one to describe which type of activi-
ties are implicated in the focus of one's analysis).
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izations.9 s One of the best ways to do so is to clearly define which
types of sharing activities one is analyzing. This article, like some
others,97 heeds such counsel and provides the following qualifier:
the remainder of this article is primarily focused on the sharing of
real and personal property (epitomized by short-term home rent-
als, ridesharing, or tool rentals).9" This article's focus will be simi-
lar to what Zale terms "property sharing" and recognizes that this
category "makes up only part of the overall sharing economy.' 99
Zale defines "property sharing" as "when property owned or pos-
sessed by Party A is temporarily used or accessed by Party B (ei-
ther exclusively or simultaneously with A), with ownership or
possession returning to Party A after an agreed-upon period of
time.""1 ' These components are key to also understanding what
will be discussed in more detail in the next part-property that is
shared in this sector is used or accessed rather than owned. The
transfer of possession to facilitate such use or access is temporary
rather than permanent and involves something less than grant-
ing an ownership share. In such a situation, the sharer retains
ownership the entire time and has an enforceable expectation for
a return of any property and the cessation of use at a pre-
determined future point in time.
Sharing property is not a new innovation, but the emerging
sharing "economy" is both innovative and the product of innova-
on." Large scale sharing--of both property and services-is a
new phenomenon in large part because new technologies have on-
ly recently made facilitation of such activities economic and feasi-
ble.0 2 So, while sharing is not new, "recently developed infor-
96. Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 906 (explaining why defining the scope of a paper is
critical and that "generalizations regarding the sharing economy... should be made care-
fully" because of the distinct types of sharing arrangements grouped within the term).
97. See id. (offering an example of an article limiting its subject scope to be "focused
largely on ridesharing and home sharing").
98. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 11 ('The model works for items
that are expensive to buy and are widely owned by people who do not make full use of
them. Bedrooms and cars are the most obvious examples, but you can also rent camping
spaces in Sweden, fields in Australia and washing machines in France.").
99. Zale, supra note 6, at 511-12.
100. Id.
101. See Aloni, supra note 21, at 1458 (describing "[tihe P2P economy" as an innovative
social transformation that "entrenches and intensifies existing economic and social prac-
tices and approaches").
102. See Zale, supra note 6, at 536 (explaining how many sharing economy activities
"have only become possible on a large scale because of relatively new technology, such as
GPS, smartphones, and app software").
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mation technology" makes new kinds and scales of sharing possi-
ble by reducing transaction costs and removing other difficul-
ties.'' Law professor Julia Lee explains "[t]echnology has enabled
innovative forms of exchange to emerge, spanning an ever-
broader range of products and services."'14 It is now cheaper and
easier to make the necessary connections.0 5 The social network-
ing aspects of technology also create trust- and reputation-
networks which establish monitoring, verification, and quality-
control mechanisms. These mechanisms could not exist at this
scale and levels of reliability without such technologies, and con-
sumers would not feel sufficiently confident to interact at such
level with strangers without these protections."' "[T]he availabil-
ity of more data about people and things.., allows physical as-
sets to be disaggregated and consumed as services."'' 7 And, tech-
nology-based reputation systems not only create trust, but also
enforce norms of competition and tend to improve the quality of
the products being monitored and measured.0 8 The technological
and reputation system infrastructure surrounding the new shar-
ing economy tends to replicate "the market-thickening coordina-
tion mechanisms.., such as coordinating on time and geography"
ordinarily only available in physical markets rather than those
online.0 9
Hence, sharing may have always been part of our ownership
package and even something which property owners have always
done at some level since the dawn of private property systems.
Nonetheless, what we see now are lower costs and higher reliabil-
103. Barry & Caron, supra note 16, at 70; see also Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 7, at 77
(discussing how "new technologies and online markets have significantly lowered transac-
tion costs for short-term use of personal assets"); The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra
note 11 ("[Technology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets cheaper and
easier than ever-and therefore possible on a much larger scale.').
104. Lee, supra note 92, at 141.
105. See Hamari et al., supra note 10, at 2048 (crediting technological advances as
simplifying "sharing of both physical and nonphysical goods and services"); Oei & Ring,
supra note 9, at 991 ('The technological platforms employed by these startups enable indi-
vidual producers and consumers to transact with each other with unprecedented ease.").
106. See Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 7 ("A key challenge in all markets is
facilitating trust among strangers ....").
107. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 11.
108. See generally Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 2, 7, 8 (explaining that the
sharing economy businesses have proliferated in part because of technological advances
but also emerging "recommender systems and reputation systems ... central to the func-
tion of P2P rental markets").
109. Id. at 7.
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ity mechanisms for making sharing more efficient and more prof-
itable, thereby motivating the expansion of such activities.
As seen in Part I, however, no facilitating technology could
have an impact if people did not first have both the motivation to
share and the confidence that sharing would not mean losing
ownership. There would not be a sharing boom without basic,
traditional property norms and the means for their enforcement.
So, regardless of how much credit we give the brilliance of techno-
logical innovation, strong ownership protections are a necessary
precondition to profit from sharing (at any scale) and for the will-
ingness to risk allowing others to use one's property. Thus, before
anything else, the strong system of private property ownership
deserves initial credit for the existence of the sharing economy.
Part III extends this analysis of the leading role the property law
system plays in producing the sharing economy.
III. SHARING'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
OWNERSHIP: EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION
At the heart of any understanding of sharing lies an apprecia-
tion of the sharing right as an outgrowth of the inclusion right,
which itself grows out of the exclusion right held by property
owners. This part examines each of these concepts, beginning
with an explanation of the fundamental right to exclude and then
examines why a right to include is a necessary extension of the
right to exclude, with sharing as an exercise of that right to in-
clude.
There is near universal agreement hat the right to exclude is a
"unifying or necessary characteristic" of the "concept of proper-
ty.""0° The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "right
to exclude" as fundamental to property on several occasions,"1
110. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 7 (2d ed. 2006); see
also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xxxix (5th
ed. 2010) ("[M]ost scholars agree that the right to exclude is either the most important, or
one of the most important, rights associated with ownership."); J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL.,
PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 2007) ("Since
Blackstone's time, the Anglo-American legal tradition has honored this view, but the
boundaries of the right of property have not always been easy to define.").
111. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ('The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others."); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("[O]ne of the most es-
sential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-the
right to exclude others."); Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918)
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and scholars repeatedly underscore how our current conception of
private property in the American system is based on a recognition
of the existence and dominance of exclusion theories.2
In fact, the importance of exclusion rights are exhibited from
the very early formation of ownership understanding. Part I, for
example, discussed how children begin to recognize the possibility
of a type of inclusion which does not require sacrificing owner-
ship-i.e. sharing-and begin to appreciate the meaning of the
right to include only after developing a more sophisticated appre-
ciation of the enforceable right to exclude and to demand return
of owned items.
Any understanding of the right to exclude, of course, requires
an appreciation for the necessary corollary and corresponding
right to include."3 In fact, the authority to include can only exist
if a person has the authority to exclude. The core of managing
property rights entails a property owner's authority to part with
some or all of his rights-including by relaxing the right to ex-
clude, thus exercising the right to include. Felix Cohen's view on
this relationship of rights has been described as a "notion of prop-
erty" that entails:
[A] relationship among people that entitles so-called owners to in-
clude (that is, permit) or exclude (that is, deny) use or possession of
the owned property by other people.... [T]he right to include-to
sell, for example, to another .... [D]oes not of itself result in a fully
effective power to transfer. The right to exclude is needed as well.
The two rights together are the necessary and sufficient conditions of
transferability.
1 1 4
Through this process of exclusion and inclusion, the law facili-
tates mutually beneficial exchanges, such as sharing."' After all,
rights in and to property can be altered and exchanged to satisfy
(Holmes, J., concurring) ("Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference .. ");
Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("An essential element of individual property is the
legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.").
112. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
734 (1998).
113. DUKEMINIERETAL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014).
114. Id.
115. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW 88-89 (2011) ("[T]he clear delineation of common-
law rules.., reduces the transaction costs that have to be incurred to fashion specific con-
tract solutions to correct errors in allocation under the existing property rule .... [A] vol-
untary transfer of rights could leave both sides better off than before.").
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preferences and desired distribution between parties. As law pro-
fessor Richard Epstein explains, individuals constantly seek to
better their position by finding "some way of altering the control
of various resources so as to enhance their value to all people
simultaneously: hence the critical role of voluntary exchange."'116
By exercising the corollary right to exclusion-meaning the right
to include-an owner can make a choice that facilitates exchange
of the property (or of the varying and severable rights, interests,
and permissions associated with the property).11 Mutually desir-
able and beneficial exchanges of rights and permissions helps the
market operate to meet the preferences of different actors-
including owners and non-owners."'
There is a broad menu of options available to private individu-
als wishing to engage in adjustments to initial assignments and
the trading of rights. Two or more individuals may choose to en-
ter into agreements to adjust their original ownership positions,
possibly accomplishing varying degrees of transfer of ownership
or access, depending on their desired outcome and how much they
are willing to invest in the transfer. The common law has devel-
oped several vehicles by which owners can satisfy these prefer-
ences, including some especially valuable ones that create owner-
ship-based property interests rather than mere contract rights."9
These property-based vehicles can include concurrent estates or
even "servitudes"'2 ° and to a lesser extent, licenses."' These per-
manent transfers of sticks in the ownership bundle have long op-
116. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 71 (1995).
117. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alterna-
tive Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519, 528-29 (2002) (explaining position by advo-
cates of Coasian bargaining models that "private bargaining would give landowners an
incentive to maximize joint wealth" as opposed to public control of land use).
118. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 296 (2004);
see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 113, at 809 (stating that private land use control
agreements usually "involve two or more parcels of land, and the purpose of the agree-
ments is to increase the total value of all the parcels involved," and usually "the effect of
the agreements is to burden one parcel of land for the benefit of another parcel"); JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 228 (3d ed. 2010) ("[O]wners are free to make promises re-
stricting land use for their mutual benefit and are secure in the knowledge that such re-
strictions will be enforceable.").
119. See SINGER, supra note 118, at 228 (discussing the incentives to enter into private
agreements for the control of land, including the security and enforceability issues related
to such transfers in interests in land as opposed to mere contracts).
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(adopting a single term, "servitudes," for a variety of common law mechanisms for adjust-
ing rights in land, including easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes).
121. SINGER, supra note 118, at 180.
2017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
erated to alter one's ownership position. The sharing economy has
just found new extensions for an owner's voluntary adjustment of
her exclusion rights and the exercise of her inclusion rights with-
out necessarily sacrificing any part of her ownership interests.
Law professor Daniel Kelly has produced very insightful work
on the right to include and its importance in the system of prop-
erty law.'22 If one simply observes how property owners act in real
life, one can see that ownership involves something more than
simply a way of keeping others off of one's land or away from
one's possessions.'23 Kelly's insights on the right to include help
explain how property law can empower owners to include others
in the consumption of their property-including through the
types of sharing we see in the sharing economy.24 As Kelly ex-
plains, inclusion is ubiquitous in society-both informally
through means not implicating the law and formally through
property devices or contracts.2' Indeed, "[t]he ability of owners to
'include' others in their property is a central attribute of owner-
ship and fundamental to any system of private property."'26 The
scope of Kelly's work on inclusion is much broader than "sharing,"
but he does touch on the issue and its relation to inclusion gener-
ally.
When Kelly discusses sharing, he uses the term in a slightly
different way than it is used in this article. He defines sharing as
a "gratuitous transfer" as distinguished from a contractual ex-
change, which has the attributes (and many of the benefits) of
what he defines as sharing, but that becomes more formalized
through a contract or property form.'27 For this article's purposes,
no such distinction is made. In addition to what has already been
122. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMoRY L.J. 857, 859 (2014); see
also Donald Kochan, Property as a Vehicle of Inclusion to Promote Human Sociability,
JOTWELL (Jan. 22, 2016), http://property.jotwell.com/property-as-a-vehicle-of-inclusion-
to-promote-human-sociability/ (reviewing Kelly, supra).
123. See Kelly, supra note 122, at 861; see also Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) ("That is property to which the following
label can be attached: To the world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I
may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen[.] Endorsed: The state[.]").
124. See Kelly, supra note 122, at 871-72.
125. Id. at 859.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 873 ("Unlike sharing, which entails a gratuitous transfer, exchange en-
tails a transfer with consideration. Exchange is fundamental to a market economy be-
cause, through voluntary agreements, resources move from low-value to high-value us-
ers.').
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discussed regarding Kelly's examination of the law's treatment of
inclusion more broadly, his identification of the attributes of shar-
ing as a subcategory of inclusion are also insightful (even if di-
rected toward a more limited concept of sharing as gratuitous
transfers).
According to Kelly, "[i]nclusion is critical because human be-
ings depend upon each other, not only to survive but also to flour-
ish."'128 In fact, Kelly even posits that inclusion by sharing in one
form or another might be part of human nature or a necessary
condition for human survival.9 He reaches this conclusion after
reporting on a study which examined the sharing habits of young
children and identified a 'human need to voluntarily share,"'
which Kelly speculates may in fact partially explain the emer-
gence of the sharing economy."' At the very least, his critically
important work underscores that inclusion-in varied forms, in-
cluding how it is operationalized in the sharing economy-is a
fundamental component of property rights. His research high-
lights that the right to include is as fundamental to property law
as its sibling right to exclude.
Having developed an appreciation for the right to include and
its genesis in property law, we can turn next to focusing more
closely on sharing as the exercise of one's right to include. Shar-
ing simply becomes a decision by the owner to relax her right to
exclude-in varying degrees depending on the owner's chosen
type of sharing and conditions-and to operationalize her right to
include.
Once we understand sharing in terms of temporary inclusion, it
becomes evident that all of the well-developed law and legal liter-
ature on the corresponding rights to exclude and include as pri-
mary features of property is fundamental to understanding the
sharing economy. Inclusion simply becomes one of the rights as-
sociated with property ownership, or, in the language often em-
ployed in property law, it can be considered one of the sticks in
the bundle of rights associated with private property ownership.3'
128. Id. at 871.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 871-72 (quoting Christie Nicholson, Is Civilization the Result of Humans'
Need to Share?, Sci. AM. (May 27, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/epi
sode.cfm2/BA9OA6B-C679-1D75-05835D9B22FE24FC/.
131. Grey's formulation of the things/bundles debate is illuminative:
Most people, including most specialists in their unprofessional moments, con-
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The United States Supreme Court articulated the bundle concept
as follows: "[a] common idiom describes property as a 'bundle of
sticks'-a collection of individual rights which, in certain combi-
nations, constitute property."'132
As an example underscoring inclusion as a default stick in
one's bundle, consider the increasing number of lawsuits which
seek a judicial determination of whether homeowners associa-
tions ("HOAs") can create or enforce rules through covenants,
conditions and restrictions ("CC&R's"), which prohibit short-term
rentals, particularly with respect to the members operating
through Airbnb and like-affiliations. In other words, many courts
are faced with whether CC&R's have the power to limit the shar-
ing stick in the bundle.133 The fact that HOAs must litigate
whether they have the right to prohibit short term rentals under-
scores the idea that an owner generally has the default right to
share his property with others including for a price (and a profit),
unless one removes the sharing stick from her ownership bundle
(by subjecting her control and use to a collective governance body,
like an HOA, and committing to certain CC&Rs).
Sharing, in the sense most often used in short term rentals or
goods markets, is a decision by an owner to include a stranger in
the benefits of the property. Absent the owner's choice to allow
the stranger to enjoy the property, the stranger would be a tres-
passer or otherwise lack the authority or permission to access or
use the property. In fact, trespass law itself is a recognition of the
common law's default tendency against sharing. Yet, we know
ceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To own property is to
have exclusive control over something - to be able to use it as one wishes, to
sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use
of one's property are conceived as departures from an ideal conception of full
ownership. By contrast, the theory of property rights held by the modern spe-
cialist ... fragments the robust unitary conception of ownership into a more
shadowy "bundle of rights."
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 PROPERTY 69, 69 (J. Roland & John
W. Chapman eds., 1980); see also Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV.
1053, 1061 (1989) ("[T]he bundle metaphor... expresses a special sense of the separability
of the various sorts of legally recognized interests.").
132. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928)). Although the literature usually uses the
"bundle of sticks" metaphor only for real property, for this article's purpose, there is con-
ceptual utility in applying it to both real property and chattels.
133. See, e.g., Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner's Ass'n, 352 P.3d 492, 497
(Idaho 2015) (citing cases from multiple jurisdictions dealing with HOAs authority to re-
strict short-term rentals).
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that owners nonetheless allow persons to enter their property.
But we set as a default that, without an owner's permission
(which can be termed his decision to share), a non-owner entering
the property of an owner is a trespasser.
Moreover, the contrast between time- or purpose-limited inclu-
sion, primarily through access-as juxtaposed against transfers
of ownership-is fundamental to understanding the sharing
economy."' In the "most common mode of exchange" present in
the sharing economy, Finnish economist Juho Hamari and her co-
colleagues explain that "[a]ccess over ownership means that users
may offer and share their goods and services to other users for a
limited time through peer-to-peer sharing activities, such as rent-
ing and lending."'' 1
It is critical to note that, in these access-based circumstances,
ownership remains with the sharer. If an individual simply sells
her property to another or transfers part of her ownership inter-
ests, she may be giving someone an "ownership share" in the
property,36 but she is not engaging in "sharing," as the word is
most commonly used in relation to the inclusion-related modern
sharing economy vehicles. As consumer marketing scholars
Christoph Baumeister and Florian Wagenheim articulate, "[i]n
[the] case of ownership, money is exchanged for ownership be-
tween buyer and seller to complete a market transaction. In con-
trast, an access transaction exchanges money for consumption
time, while the ownership stays with the provider at all times."'37
The sharee is simply consuming resources in an access-related,
rather than ownership-related, capacity.38 The sharee is using,
134. See Zale, supra note 6, at 533.
135. Hamari et al., supra note 10, at 2049 (citing Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt,
Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 882-83
(2012)).
136. See Zale, supra note 6, at 542-43 (cataloging the ways in which "numerous proper-
ty interests enable owners to exercise their right to share their property with others," in-
cluding the ways to grant rights to shared ownership).
137. Christoph Baumeister & Florian V. Wagenheim, Access Versus Ownership: Under-
standing Consumers' Consumption Mode Preference 5 (2014), https://ssrn.com/sol3/papers
2.cfm?abstract_id=2463076 (citing Yu Chen, Possession and Access: Consumer Desires and
Value Perceptions Regarding Contemporary Art Collection and Exhibit Visits, 35 J.
CONSUMER RES. 925 (2009); Jeffrey F. Durgee & Gina C. O'Connor, An Exploration Into
Renting as Consumption Behavior, 12 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 89, 90 (1995)).
138. Baumeister & Wagenheim, supra note 137, at 3 ("Users who fulfill their consump-
tion needs via the access consumption mode typically pay for a temporary right to enjoy
the benefits of a good that is not owned by them, but by a third party that provides ac-
cess.") (citing Chen, supra note 137); C. Lovelock & E. Gummesson, Whither Services Mar-
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accessing, and being included in the stick, while the sharer is the
owner of the stick at all times. Sharing involves including a
stranger in one's owned property, whereas ownership transfers
involve granting a piece of the ownership pie to another. For ex-
ample, when individuals engage in "ride-sharing" through models
like Uber or Lyft, car owners "sell rides in their cars."'39 Similarly,
when individuals engage in short term real property rentals
through Airbnb, homeowners are selling stays in their houses.4 '
In an ownership transfer, the owner grants something more
than contractually based permission. She gives a legal, property-
based and enforceable entitlement to the grantee. "Ownership
sharing" involves a permanency to the transfer,4 1 whereas the
temporary nature of the authorizations and inclusion granted is a
fundamental aspect of the sharing concept as understood in the
sharing economy.
When others use or consume an owner's property, they are
sharing in the usage within their granted consumption rights, but
not ownership rights. The sharee, for example, cannot sell the
home to another while the sharee is staying under contract with
Airbnb. They are being included in the property but not included
in ownership or the extensive rights associated with ownership.
The sharing economy, then, is about two categories of partici-
pants. Some people will choose to own and offer to include others
in their property for a price-they supply the sharing-related
property.14 1 Others will value non-ownership and the access to the
property owned by another and will desire to be included without
keting? In Search of a New Paradigm and Fresh Perspectives, 7 J. SERV. RES. 20-41 (2004).
139. Dyal-Chand supra note 3, at 252 (emphasis added); see also Oei & Ring, supra
note 9, at 999-1005 (describing ridesharing business models).
140. See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 3, at 251-52 (describing Airbnb, including the
fact that "the process is largely under the control of the individual hosts'); Oei & Ring, su-
pra note 9, at 1005-06 (describing peer-to-peer lodging and accommodation business mod-
els).
141. Zale, supra note 6, at n.249 ('When thinking more broadly about sharing in the
context of property, we can see how many well-established property law doctrines impli-
cate sharing in a more permanent sense (such as leases for terms of years, or co-tenancy
agreements, or ownership in a common interest community or condominium develop-
ment).").
142. See Thomas A. Weber, The Question of Ownership in a Sharing Economy, 48 HAW.
INT'L CONF. ON SYS. SC. 4874, 4874 (2015) https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/
hicss/2015/7367/00/7367e874.pdf ("In the purchasing period .... [G]iven a functioning
peer-to-peer exchange, [one] agent thinks that the item may now well be worth buying be-
cause renting it out when not needed remains an option.").
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asking to own-they demand the property supplied by owners.1 4 3
To put it simply, some people buy while others would rather
share."'
Professors John Horton and Richard Zeckhauser, economists
from NYU and Harvard, summarize this reality and stress what
is a primary conclusion of this article. They contend that the
sharing economy is grounded in the division between "owners and
non-owners [or 'users']" because "[b]efore anyone can 'share,'
someone has to own and others have to not own (but still want to
consume at least some of the good)."'45 Or, as economists Samuel
Fraiberger and Arun Sundararajan describe it, decisions-
whether to buy for exclusive use, buy and become a sharer, or re-
frain from buying and use as a sharee-involve "consumers who
have heterogeneous price sensitivity, utilization rates, and pref-
erence shocks."'46 These "[n]ew rental marketplaces can increase
allocative efficiency by creating new gains from trade between
consumers, may generate additional surplus for consumers who
could not previously afford ownership, may shift consumption to-
wards higher quality products, and might even increase manufac-
turer surplus by inducing new 'ownership for peer-to-peer rental
supply.""" It is a matter of preference and choice, determined by
a variety of variables, but also determined from a set of options
that has necessarily expanded as sharing opportunities have in-
creased.
On the supply side, owners are able to monetize the underused
utility in their property and offer those uses for rent 8 without
sacrificing the ownership itself, which would be required if they
sold the full bundle of property or even if they sold just a stick
(like with concurrent ownership). Another distinguishing charac-
teristic currently occurring in sharing markets is that sharing
economy models "facilitate [trade, which] is largely between indi-
143. See id. ("In the purchasing period, one agent reasons that the possibility of shar-
ing will afford access to the item in question if needed later on and thus forgo a purchase.
In that case, the presence of a sharing market would lead to a decrease in sales.").
144. Id. ("In an economy where everything is shared the question arises, who will own
the various items, and who will rely on others to obtain access when needed?").
145. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 9 ("Our model's first task is to explain how
consumers divide between owners and non-owners.").
146. Fraiberger & Sundararajan, supra note 93, at 4.
147. Id.
148. See Zale, supra note 6, at 532 ("Finally, to monetize and share property, there is
an implicit underlying requirement that an individual must own-or at least possess-
property that others seek to access.").
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viduals or peer-to-peer ather than between an individual and a
firm."'49 Owners in the current version of the sharing economy are
not, for the most part, in the business of exclusively renting their
properties. The owners also use and consume the properties they
are sharing, either at the same time but with excess concurrent
capacity or at different times or in different manners. Whereas a
typical property is owned and dedicated to the interests of the
owner, an asset provided in a sharing economy platform is avail-
able to more users. This may cause some to invest in properties
which traditionally might have been designed for a single owner
to capitalize on the value available if the property is instead de-
voted to a sharing enterprise." Such purchases for purposes of
dedicated "sharing" begin to blur the line between peer-to-peer
and firm-like behavior.
On the demand side, users make a choice that they value ac-
cess over ownership. For example, some may decide to forgo buy-
ing a car when they live in a big city with substantial parking dif-
ficulties because using ride-sharing activities satisfies their
preferences at a lower cost to them."'
In fact, many individuals gain access to goods and real property
they would otherwise be unable to consume but for owners choos-
ing to engage in sharing arrangements with those non-owner ac-
cess seekers. Sharing is often cheaper than buying, and sharing
marketplaces allow individuals who were financially barred from
owning certain resources to access and benefit from otherwise,
heretofore unobtainable assets. According to an empirical study
by Fraiberger and Sundararajan, results "consistently show eco-
nomically significant improvements in consumer welfare due to
the availability of the 'sharing economy' marketplace, and signifi-
cantly higher improvements for the below-median income seg-
ment.""' 2 Thus, the lower-income brackets benefit most from hav-
ing access to sharing resources at a lower price than the market
would provide for outright purchase."' These findings lead
149. Fraiberger & Sundararajan, supra note 93, at 3.
150. Id. (discussing the incentive structures for choosing to purchase property that
might be used in sharing exchanges); see also Weber, supra note 142, at 4874, 4880 (ex-
plaining that a robust sharing market may actually increase demand for ownership be-
cause properties can be purchased to devote to profitable sharing arrangements).
151. See, e.g., Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 9-10 (describing the choices to
become an owner or a user of property in the sharing economy).
152. Fraiberger & Sundararajan, supra note 93, at 28.
153. Id. ('This segment is more likely to switch from owning to renting, provides a
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Fraiberger and Sundararajan to conclude "the true promise of the
sharing economy" may be "as a force that democratizes access to a
higher standard of living."'54 Simply put, "[o]wnership is a more
significant barrier to consumption when your income or wealth is
lower, and peer-to-peer rental marketplaces can facilitate inclu-
sive and higher quality consumption, empowering ownership en-
abled by revenues generated from marketplace supply, and facili-
tating a more even distribution of consumer value.""' If
regulation drives up the price of sharing, however, these positive
effects will undoubtedly be reduced.
While sharees may be forgoing ownership (much like individu-
als in cities with well-developed public transportation systems
might choose to forego owning a car), they are nonetheless becom-
ing a class of individuals who are sharing in someone else's own-
ership. This, however, is not evidence of a declining ownership
model for property, as some would claim."6 In fact, it may very
well represent a more efficient model with fuller utilization of
ownership potential. And, it may illustrate the economic benefit
in allocating ownership dollars so that every property is better
utilized by dividing the property's "labor" (or contribution), much
like specialization and division of human labor leads to a more ef-
ficient allocation of human capital.
Even if one adopts the idea that a resource should be relatively
accessible for sharing-perhaps at minimal cost-it seems nearly
impossible to imagine an initial capital outlay for the creation of
the good or the investment in the acquisition of the property, lat-
er dedicated to sharing, without some initial grant of ownership
rights. Such a notion would also require the maintenance of an
identifiable owner throughout the property's lifetime who has ul-
timate control and managerial responsibility over the property.
Setting aside utopian ideas of common ownership or socialist type
controls on ownership, most of the sharing economy activities in-
volve traditional investment in property. This property is simply
higher level of peer-to-peer marketplace demand, is more likely to contribute to market-
place supply, and enjoys significantly higher levels of surplus gains.").
154. Id. at 28-29 ("Perhaps the most important takeaway from our current findings,
one we fully expect to persist with extensions and alternative calibrations, is that peer-to-
peer rental marketplaces have a disproportionately positive effect on lower-income con-
sumers across almost every measure.").
155. Id. at 29.
156. See generally, e.g., Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access (May 11, 2016), http:
//ssrn.com/abstract=2777119.
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being dedicated-after the initial acquisition and establishment
of ownership rights-to new or broadened uses designed to max-
imize the utility of the resource.
If at any point the sharing model no longer encompasses a pro-
ductive and efficient use of the resource, the owner (who has not
abandoned any of her traditional rights to property, including
control rights) can alter the ways in which the property is utilized
and experienced, moving the property away from dedication to
the sharing model. Such changes in an owner's sharing position
would be subject only to any existing contractual restraints.
Where an apartment might at one point be turned into an
Airbnb outlet, the owner can recommit the resource to a purely
private residence if the rents become too low or the hassle too
much. Would-be sharees could not make any demand to stay at
the apartment after the shift away from the sharing model pre-
cisely because these strangers to the property would not have any
ownership rights to it. Airbnb, as a business, for example, cannot
demand that the apartment remain in its rental pool in perpetui-
ty for the exact same reasons. Such a situation would be no dif-
ferent than an owner of a retail space deciding that bookstores
are no longer profitable and thereafter making an ownership de-
cision to re-constitute the space as a burger joint. The decisions
over how to use the property, including the decision to change the
usage, remain and reside with the owner. The right to choose
whether to share comes with the rights to choose with whom to
share, reject a would-be sharee, eject the sharee, and otherwise
exit the relationship (subject to potential liability for violation of
contractual terms and for any public policies that might restrict
contractual behavior, such as anti-discrimination laws).
The sharer retains ownership rights and control over the prop-
erty. The sharee is merely partaking in a privileged use of the
property as a result of the sharer's choice. The sharer can share
because it is hers, making ownership the primary prerequisite to
the sharing enterprise. Sharing-whether informally, like hosting
dinner guests, or more formally, such as through a homesharing
contract-simply becomes an extension of the primary rights as-
sociated with one's ability to use the property one owns. As the
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noted property theorist James E. Penner has explained, "the abil-
ity to share one's things, or let others use them, is fundamental in
the idea of property.157
IV. DEFINING "SHARING" OF PROPERTY AS DISTINCTIVELY USED IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE MODERN "SHARING ECONOMY"
The sharing economy is an exchange economy with critical fea-
tures that include the exchange of interests in property and a
conferral of rights to use or benefit from real or personal property.
It is an exchange in property similar to how one leases, grants an
easement or license, or otherwise allows one to enjoy the benefits
of one's property, including informal, no-exchange and gratuitous
inclusions, like dinner guests and weekend stays by the in-laws
at your home, or co-workers sharing a ride to the diner for lunch.
While the sharing economy may involve gratuitous sharing at
times, most often "sharing with a price" better equates with our
discussions of exchange. Either way, it fits within the notion of
inclusion and the sticks that one has in their property to allow
others to enjoy and use.
Once we understand the need to appreciate the link between
sharing and ownership, we can better identify the unique charac-
teristics we are attributing to the word "sharing" as it is presently
being used in sharing economy literature. Such a definition
should also allow us to better distinguish sharing from other
types of stranger relationships with property-like commons,
trespass, and stealing-and from other cooperative property rela-
tionships, like concurrent tenancies. "Sharing," as the term is
usually used in recent literature, is a special brand of permission;
the retained ownership interest and the right of revocability dis-
tinguishes "sharing" from these other types of relationships.
Very broadly stated, to "share property" should be defined as:
to include, formally or informally, another in the use and enjoy-
ment-and sometimes even formal ownership interests-of one's
property.
There are various ways in which we use the word "share" in
our vocabulary, including our usage related to property itself. For
example, I might say in a will that I want my children to each get
157. James E. Penner, The ' Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 745 (1996).
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a share of my estate upon my death. Or, I might own a share of a
corporation or in partnership assets. Or, we may share some
property in a type of concurrent estate, where co-ownership or co-
tenancy is present. In each of these situations, the word "share" is
used to connote some formal shared ownership interest in an as-
set.
Alternatively, I might say that I want to share my dinner table
with my friends for Thanksgiving. Or, I might share a ride with
my co-worker so that we can use the carpool lane. Or, I might say
that I am letting my neighbors share my backyard for a game of
croquet played across our two properties. Certainly these uses of
the word do not suggest hat I want my friends to have an owner-
ship interest in my dinner table or my house when they visit and
dine with me, that I am claiming an ownership interest in my co-
worker's car, or that my croquet-playing neighbor can somehow
profit from the sale of my backyard because he has some stick in
that bundle. These most immediate examples, instead, illustrate
a use of the word "share" to indicate my willingness to allow
someone to interact with and benefit from something that I own
and the "sharing" is possible if and only if I permit it. The sharing
is not mandated as a result of some pre-existing legal, property
rights-based claim to the access or use in question.
More often than not, when individuals use the word "share" or
"sharing' to discuss interactions in the sharing economy, their
use equates with the latter examples rather than the former-at
least when it comes to real property and chattel. The sharing
which occurs in the sharing economy is principally related to this
type of non-ownership interest which could either involve infor-
mal sharing, which does not rise to the level of contract rights
(like hosting friends at dinner or neighbors competing at croquet)
or, in its more sophisticated and emerging form, it could involve a
more formal type of sharing of property, but by contract rather
than through a transfer of an ownership interest in the thing.
So, the type of sharing we see in Airbnb or Uber, for example,
is distinguished from a tenancy in common for a house or a co-
ownership interest in a car because there is no transfer of a fee
interest in the house or a property right in the car when those
things are "shared." This is also the differentiating factor which
explains why the sharing economy is not equivalent to the types
of "shares" in property that we discuss when talking about a
partnership, corporation, trust share, or inheritance. If you ask a
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passenger in an Uber-operated vehicle whether she owns the car,
she will likely (and should) say no. If you ask an individual whose
name is jointly titled to a car with another individual whether
she both shares and has an ownership interest in the car, she will
undoubtedly answer yes-quite differently from the passenger in
the Uber-operated rideshare vehicle. A similar contrast could be
drawn when asking whether either "owns" the house in which
they are sleeping.
Thus, we can start to develop some distinguishing characteris-
tics for the use of "share" and "sharing" in the sharing economy
context, from which we can also begin to develop a definition, in-
formed by our appreciation for the prerequisite role of ownership
and the right to include when forming the terms governing the
sharing relationship. Again, this article limits the scope (and the
forthcoming definition) to the sharing of real property and chat-
tel. While what is being said here can certainly be extrapolated to
better understand the meaning of sharing services in the sharing
economy,' service- and human capital-based sharing are beyond
the scope of this article.
Sharing occurs when an owner-sharer grants a nonowner-
sharee permission to use, possess, or access sharer's property
without transferring an ownership interest and without an ex
ante legal obligation to so share (such as through a pre-existing
concurrent estate). Put more precisely, an ownership-sensitive
definition of sharing can be stated as follows: sharing of a good or
real property exists when Owner ("0") exercises her right to in-
clude by authorizing Stranger ("S") to the property the temporary
right to use or access O's property in some limited and defined
manner-converting what would have been a trespassory act by
S, into a legal, non-trespassory act-where such authorization is
revocable by 0 in property law, but where liability may exist in
contract for any such revocation or interference by 0 in the rights
or authority granted by 0 to S.
Scholars, judges, and regulators should proceed to use such an
ownership-sensitive definition-recognizing that sharing is an ex-
tension of ownership and involves an application of the ownership
stick authorizing the exercise of the right to include. By doing so,
158. See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 7, at 78 (noting the distinction between "transac-
tions that share products and transactions that provide services'); Oei & Ring, supra note
9, at 1007 (describing examples of service-based sharing business models).
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they will acknowledge both the legal and practical reality that
ownership is a predicate to sharing and that the motivation to
share consequently can be substantially diminished if strong pro-
tections for ownership rights are not maintained in any legal or
policy reforms.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE OWNERSHIP PREREQUISITE ON SHARING
REGULATIONS
The sharing economy is being examined closely, in part to de-
termine what regulatory structures and mechanisms should be
applied to it."5 This final part examines those questions very gen-
erally. This part concludes-as its principal contribution to this
growing, complex discussion-that, while making regulatory de-
cisions, law and policymaking must continue to remember that
any regulation of sharing is a regulation of property ownership,
rather than simply the regulation of ordinary business activity.
There are a lot of unknowns for sharing economy industries
when it comes to understanding the regulations associated with
their emerging and expanding market footprint."' Regulators too
are only beginning to grasp their sphere of authority (or lack
thereof) over sharing activities and when and how to seek new,
expanded, or better-tailored authority to govern sharing. These
regulators are struggling to identify a regulatory structure, espe-
cially with respect to the proper regulations of owners of the as-
sets shared (a set of questions that have been left "largely in the
background"), rather than the businesses running the platform
for the sharing, which look more like traditionally regulated
businesses (and which have been the focus of most regulatory ef-
forts to date).6'
159. See Aloni, supra note 21, at 1427-30 (surveying the types of regulatory approaches
and paradigms recently being advanced by policymakers and academics); Miller, supra
note 2, at 150 (setting forth proposed governing principles for the design of regulatory
structures targeting aspects of the sharing economy, with a particular focus on short term
rentals like Airbnb).
160. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 3, at 244 (describing the uncertain state of regulating
sharing economy activities); Miller, supra note 2, at 200 ('The sharing economy is chang-
ing quickly, thus complicating a clear regulatory response."); The Rise of the Sharing
Economy, supra note 11 (explaining that the "main worry is regulatory uncertainty").
161. Dyal-Chand, supra note 3, at 246.
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Some cities have made the reflexive choice to ban certain shar-
ing activities.162 As Miller explains, however, this may not be an
optimal choice given that, even when sharing activities are made
illegal, "the market for sharing economy uses is insatiable" and
individuals will defy or circumvent bans.163
As stated above, one might consider the "sharing right" as an-
other stick in the bundle of rights representing the interests asso-
ciated with any one piece of property, closely linked with the right
to include. It is a stick that is subject to common law limitations
and statutory or regulatory control through public laws just like
other sticks associated with the property.
Several other regulatory controls seem to exist that are natu-
rally or seamlessly applicable to the sharing economy. Generally,
applicable land use controls, like nuisance, could carry much of
the regulatory load to control against externalities caused by new
or increased intensity of property uses."' Similarly, existing civil
and criminal laws provide consumer protection and control
against fraud and other abuses.'65 Moreover, reputational con-
trols, long applauded by advocates of private ordering, are receiv-
ing renewed interest as effective mechanisms for private en-
forcement of market standards and discipline for bad actors in
the sharing economy, especially with diminished information
costs facilitated by the internet and social networking.'66 Some
contend that attempts to add new regulatory regimes, beyond
what have already been generally developed, could actually be
counterproductive-decreasing the supply of sharing resources
and thereby decreasing the diversity of consumer choice.67
This article remains agnostic on the advisability or practicality
of the existing regimes and whether we should add other ways to
control sharing activities. Sharing raises questions regarding how
zoning or other land use controls might be used to regulate shar-
162. Miller, supra note 2, at 156 (describing some initial efforts by several cities to
"banf certain sharing economy uses").
163. Id.
164. See Michael N. Widener, Shared Spatial Regulating in Sharing-Economy Dis-
tricts, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 111, 125, 133-34, 159 (2015).
165. Spencer W. Waller et al., Consumer Protection in the United States: An Overview
3-5 (Eur. J. of Consumer L. Working Paper, May 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000226.
166. See Koopman et al., supra note 16, at 541-42.
167. See id. at 532 (describing the ill-fitting and reflexive attempts by municipalities to
"impose older regulatory regimes on these new services without much thought about
whether they are still necessary to protect consumer welfare").
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ing activities. Other issues-like whether and how to tax sharing
activities like hotels, or whether we should create licensing re-
gimes for ridesharing providers similar to those which traditional
taxicab markets have been subjected-are not new or unique to
sharing as a use of property. The same is true for the develop-
ment of consumer protection law, which regularly must decide
how to ensure new entrants to the market are not circumventing
policies.
Owners may place themselves in certain categories of control
established by law based on different types or degrees of usage,
such as converting an informal and private dinner party into a
public accommodation. When the owner's legal character changes
from the private side of the spectrum to the commercial side,168
policymakers and judges might choose to regulate enhanced de-
grees of sharing similar to our regulation of firms (with anti-
discrimination laws, labor laws, or similar restrictions being trig-
gered by the activity's classification). Again, this article does not
propose standards for how or if this should be done. Such choices
are inevitable, yet must be made with a background understand-
ing of the ownership rights being implicated.
There is no doubt that these types of questions and concerns
will need to be addressed as law and policy adapt to the emerging
sharing economy and its social effects.'69 Every property regime
eventually develops a set of rules to control its negative externali-
ties and to coordinate its operation with other social values.'
But, the specific parameters of any of these regulatory choices
need not be determined to understand the more basic point of this
article.
This article has sought to stress that regulators must under-
stand the basic ownership idea from these pages before proceed-
168. See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 7, at 64 (explaining that the sharing economy in-
creasingly "calls into question the foundational distinction between privately used proper-
ty and commercial property"); see Miller, supra note 2, at 202 ('The differences between
individual and corporate interests are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish as the
sharing economy matures.").
169. Aloni, supra note 21, at 1420 (explaining why "the debate on the [peer-to-peer]
economy-its benefits and drawbacks-is a heated and complicated one'); Dyal-Chand,
supra note 3, at 308-09 ("Regulation of the sharing economy is, of course, inevitable" and
the "regulatory options are rich and varied"); Oei & Ring, supra note 9, at 991 (discussing
the necessity to deal with the "important legal and regulatory issues" raised by the shar-
ing economy).
170. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) ("Property rights serve hu-
man values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.").
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ing. The understanding that sharing is grounded in ownership
should inform the debate on such regulatory choices and the pa-
rameters, scope, structure, and appropriateness of different regu-
latory regimes that might be developed in relation to these
emerging and disruptive property uses. The legal and regulatory
decision makers should appreciate the implications of affecting
owners and ownership whenever an entity regulates sharing ac-
tivities. They should be aware, for example, of potential hurdles
ahead-such as running the gauntlet of takings law to determine
whether regulation of a shared property goes too far in limiting
ownership rights, much the same as we do when we evaluate rent
control, building codes, or used car sales.
The lesson intended by this article is that one cannot regulate
sharing without regulating ownership itself. This reality has im-
plications for any step in the judicial, legislative, or regulatory
process. Sensitivity to the reality of ownership principles as the
foundation to sharing will ensure that both sharing and owner-
ship prosper.
CONCLUSION
The sharing economy has opened up myriad new opportunities
for the expanded and more efficient utilization of property assets.
But individuals cannot share what is not theirs and will not share
what they fear losing if, upon giving up possession, they do not
have reasonably certain legal guarantees of a right to effectively
demand its return.
Property law's robust protections for ownership can create the
prerequisite fertile legal atmosphere necessary to motivate shar-
ing. Therefore, property law would do well to remember the pow-
er of ownership principles as drivers for the enterprise of sharing
principles-developed by individuals as early as childhood and in-
forming our choices to share ever since. Regulators too should be
cautious about constricting sharing activities and remain con-
scious of the reality that they are concomitantly restricting pri-
vate property rights. Scholars and commentators should take no-
tice of the utility in an ownership-sensitive definition for
"sharing" when it comes to goods and real property in the sharing
economy. This ownership-sensitive conception of sharing helps to
properly place the activities we are witnessing within a cohesive
framework of property law and its foundational rights of exclu-
sion and inclusion.
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